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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
ANTICIPATORY ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME AND THE
PERSON TAXABLE UNDER THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE
Considerations governing the choice of the taxable person and shifting
of the tax burden by assignment of income have become more or less
important as changes in the Federal income tax laws have been made
through the years. The problem with which we are concerned is in
selecting the taxable person under the income tax laws. Once this has been
settled we find, by definition, that if the assignor is the person properly
taxable, then there has been an anticipatory assignment of income, but if
the assignee must bear the tax burden, the assignment of income is not
deemed anticipatory in nature.
The first income tax law under the Sixteenth Amendment was enacted
as part of the Tariff Act of 1913 and individuals, under the progressive
feature of the tax, were subject to a combined normal and surtax of 7 per
cent on taxable net income in excess of $500,000 per year. Steeply grad-
uated progressive rates did not appear until the outbreak of World War I
and the Revenue Act of 1916, the peak of wartime taxes being reached
with the Revenue Act of 1918 with the combined normal and surtax being
71 per cent on net taxable income in excess of $1,000,000. Even though
rates declined thereafter until the depression of 1932, extremely high tax
rates on the top brackets of individual income have become a permanent
feature of all subsequent revenue acts.' The reduction in tax liability that
can be effected by individuals in the higher brackets, if they are able to
shift income from one taxable person to another, is too obviously a matter
of common experience to warrant further elaboration.
A measure of relief from the progressive tax rates was found in the
community property states of the west and southwest 2 where husband
and wife, under applicable provisions of local law, were each allowed to
return one-half of the income constituting the property of the com-
munity.3 The mounting surtaxes of World War II brought additional
pressure on noncommunity states for the tax advantages of the community
property system, resulting first in the adoption of community property
laws in several more jurisdictions, 4 and finally in the provision of the
IInt. Rev. Code § 1, 26 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1954); Int. Rev. Code § 11(a), 26 U.S.C.A.
11 l(a) (1939).
2 In 1913, when the first income tax was passed, the community property system
existed in the eight states of Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Texas and Washington.
3Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792
(1931).
4 Between 1945 and 1947, community property laws were passed in Michigan, Okla-
homa, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Nebraska and the Territory of Hawaii.
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Revenue Act of 19485 permitting spouses to divide their combined income
between them for purposes of computing their total tax. However, even
though the substantial relief allowed by split-income provisions is as much
a part of our income tax laws today as are the progressive rates, the prob-
lem of anticipatory assignment of income and possible shifting of the tax
burden will remain so long as a tax advantage can thereby be gained.
The first, and to this day the foremost, case involving a construction of
the concept of the "taxable person" under the income tax law was Lucas
v. Earl,6 and concerned the taxable years 1920 and 1921. Taxpayer and
his wife, by a written contract entered into in 1901, agreed that any prop-
erty they then had or might thereafter acquire, including salaries, would
be treated as held in joint tenancy. Taxpayer was an attorney, and under
this agreement sought to split income from legal fees with his wife. The
Revenue Act of 1921 imposed a tax on the income of every individual
".. . from salaries, wages or compensation for personal services of what-
ever kind and in whatever form paid."' 7 Justice Holmes, in his oft-quoted
decision, in finding against the taxpayer held that the taxpayer was the
only party to the contracts by which the legal fees were earned and the
taxpayer alone could take the last step in the performance of these con-
tracts. He stated, further, ". . . This case is not to be decided by attenuated
subtleties. It turns on the import and reasonable construction of the taxing
act. There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who
earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory
arrangements and contracts, however skillfully devised, to prevent the
salary when paid from vesting, even for a second, in the man who earned
it. That seems to us the impact of the statute before us and we think that
no distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the
arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from
that on which they grew."
The following year, the doctrine enunciated in Lucas v. Earls was ex-
panded in Burnet v. Leininger.9 There, taxpayer and his wife, by written
contract, agreed to be one-half partners in the husband's one-half share in
a partnership. No changes were made on the books of the partnership, in
the active management or in cash distributions, but taxpayer and his wife
each returned one-half of the husband's share of partnership income. In
interpreting Section 218(a) of the Revenue Act of 192 1,10 the Court held,
5 Int. Rev. Code § 51(b), 26 U.S.C.A. § 51(b) (1939); Int. Rev. Code §9 2, 6013, 26
U.S.C.A. S9 2, 6013 (1954).
6281 U.S. 111 (1930).
7 Revenue Act of 1921, c. 136 § 213 (a), 42 Stat. 227.
8 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
9 285 U.S. 136 (1931).
10 "Individuals carrying on business in partnership shall be liable for income tax
only in their individual capacity. There shall be included in computing the net in-
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under the Lucas case, that the wife was not a partner and not entitled to
return partnership income even though she might be beneficially entitled
to one-half of her husband's partnership income. In both cases, the Court
made the distinction, although not in so many words, between property
and income. The anticipatory assignment of income was invalid for pur-
poses of shifting the tax burden under the income tax laws, even though
the agreements might be binding under local law as an assignment of
money or property after the proper taxable person had returned the in-
come under Federal law.
Subsequent cases evolved the distinction between income derived from
services and income derived from capital or, where capital rather than
labor or services so largely predominated in the production of income
that labor, as a contributing factor, may be considered de minimis.11 This
distinction, although implicit in the facts of the Lucas and Leininger cases,
was first clearly stated in Saenger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 12
in which the Court said, ". . . the rule of the Earl'3 case, while made
graphic by a figure, is more than a figure of speech. It is an expression of
the simple truth that earned incomes are taxed to and [the tax] must be
paid by those who earn them, and unearned incomes to those who own the
property or right that produces them, not to those to whom their earners
or owners are under contract to pay them. 14 It establishes once and for all
that no device or arrangement, be it ever so shrewdly or cunningly con-
trived, can make future earnings taxable to any but the earner of them,
can make future incomes from property taxable to any but the owner of
the right or title from which the income springs." An assignment of the
right to receive future income, without more, is not enough to insulate
the assignor from income tax liability. 15 Where the income is derived from
salaries or other compensation for personal services, the Lucas case has
been consistently applied.' Where, as in the case of an assignment of an
interest in a partnership, the income is derived from a combination of
come of each partner his distributive share, whether distributed or not, of the net in-
come of the partnership for the taxable year. . . ." Revenue Act of 1921, c. 136,
§ 218(a), 42 Stat. 245.
11 John J. Wheelock, 16 T.C. 1435 (1951).
12 69 F. 2d 631 (C.A.5th, 1934).
13 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
14 Taxpayer had organized a corporation to whom he was under contract to per-
form services as a theater operator and the theaters which taxpayer operated paid the
corporation directly for his services. The payment for taxpayer's services, although
billed from the corporaton by whom taxpayer was employed, was held income to
taxpayer.
15 Wisdom et ux. v. United States, 205 F. 2d 30 (C.A. 9th, 1953).
10 Jones v. Page, 102 F.2d 144 (C.A.Sth, 1939), cert. denied 308 U.S. 562 (1939);
Saenger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 69 F.2d 631 (C.A.Sth, 1934).
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capital and services, a question of fact is always involved as to whether
there has been a valid assignment of the property primarily instrumental
in the production of the income. If no attempt is even made to assign
partnership property, the case is clearly an anticipatory assignment of in-
come and squarely within the doctrine of the Leininger and Lucas cases.
Even where the partnership has assignable assets, if the partnership income
is primarily attributed to the personal efforts of the active partner or
partners, a valid assignment of the partnership assets under local law may
not be sufficient to shift the tax burden to the assignees who do not con-
tribute their personal services to the production of income. 17
Considerations of the assignment of partnership income lead logically
into the area of the assignment of income-producing property or property
rights, where the services or efforts of the assignor do not contribute in
any way, or at least not materially, to the production of income. The
critical question and paramount criterion in finding the facts is
"... whether the assignor retains sufficient power and control over the
assigned property ... to make it reasonable to treat him as the recipient
of the income for tax purposes."' 8 Three cases were decided in the circuit
court of appeals shortly after Lucas v. Earl,19 all involving the assignment
of property held in trust or assigned into trust, and the person taxable on
the trust income. In Lowery v. Helvering20 taxpayer assigned her life
interest in a residuary estate held in trust to the remaindermen. The court
said, in effect, that the assignment of the life income was completely effec-
tive in denuding the taxpayer of all interest in the property and distin-
guished the Lucas and Leininger cases by pointing out that in the latter,
although the assignment of the choses in action was just as absolute and
unconditional as in the instant case, they were conditional upon the con-
tinued performance of the assignor. The same court later held that where
a settlor created a trust for the benefit of his wife and creditors, reserving
in himself the right to repurchase the certificates of beneficial interest,
thereby terminating the trust, there was an outright assignment of an in-
terest recognized as existing property and the income from the trust was
taxable to the holders of the certificates of beneficial interest.21 The third
circuit also distinguished the Lucas case when a taxpayer assigned patents
which he owned to himself as trustee and then, in his individual capacity,
assigned and sold to his wife an undivided one-third interest in all the
17Wisdom et ux. v. United States, 205 F. 2d 30 (C.A. 9th, 1953). The decision in the
case was strengthened by reason of the fact that the assignees were taxpayer's wife
and daughters, indicating an attempt merely to shift the tax burden.
18 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948).
19281 U.S. 111 (1930).
20 70 F.2d 713 (C.A.2d, 1934).
21 Shanley v. Bowers, 81 F.2d 13 (C.A.2d, 1936).
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revenues on the patents to which he might be entitled in his individual
capacity.2 2 This court held, as did the second circuit, that all right, title,
and interest in and to the property had been assigned; that since the lia-
bility for income taxes falls upon the true owner of the property or upon
him who effectively controls the use and disposition of the income, the
assignor was successful in shifting the tax burden.
The first, and still the most important, case to reach the Supreme Court
relating to the assignment of the right or title to property held in trust
was Blair v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.23 Taxpayer was the in-
come beneficiary of a trust for life. From time to time he irrevocably
assigned to his children the right to receive the income under the trust
during the taxpayer's life in varying fixed amounts.24 Sections 162 (a) and
(b) of the Revenue Act of 192825 impose upon the beneficiary of a trust
liability for tax upon the income distributable to the beneficiary. The
Court, speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, once again distinguished
the Lucas and Leininger cases, pointing out that the tax is imposed not
upon the beneficiary, but upon the person entitled to the beneficial inter-
est under the trust. Valid assignments, under local law, of the beneficial
interest in a trust are not prohibited by the revenue acts. The assignee of
a valid assignment of the beneficial interest becomes the beneficiary of the
trust and the income is distributable to him. "An assignment by the life
beneficiary, of the right to trust income for the lifetime of said bene-
ficiary, is an assignment of all the rights which the assignor has in the
trust estate. '26 As the assignees became the owners of the specified bene-
ficial interest in the income of the trust, these interests were taxable
to them. The same conclusion was subsequently reached as in the Blair
case where a taxpayer made a gift by assignment to his wife of his interest
in an oil lease, the wife receiving all future payments.27
The series of cases relating the taxable person to the source of the in-
come, whether the source be a natural person, as in the Lucas case, the
combined effect of personal services and capital as in the Leininger case
or exclusively capital, as in the Blair case, culminated in 1940 with the
22 Byrnes v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 89F.2d 243 (C.A.3d, 1937).
23 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
24 See Ellen v. Booth, 36 B.T.A. 141 (1937), clarifying the rule that where only a
portion of a life beneficiary's right to trust income is irrevocably assigned, the Blair
case, if otherwise applicable, is to be applied to that fractional share.
2 5 Revenue Act of 1928 § 162 (a) (b), 26 U.S.C.A. § 162 (a) (b) (1928).
26 Blair v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
27 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. O'Donnell, 90 F.2d 907 (C.A.9th, 1937), the
court holding this was not an anticipatory assignment of income since the interest-
producing property was the contract, which taxpayer assigned, the assignee acquir-
ing all rights formerly held by the taxpayer.
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decision in Helvering v. Horst.2 1 Taxpayer, who was on the cash basis, de-
tached coupons from a series of negotiable bonds of which he was the
owner and presented them to the donee as a gift shortly before the
coupons matured. The court held under the Lucas case that the income
from the coupons was taxable to the donor as though no gift had been
made. Realization of income is the taxable event, rather than the acquisi-
tion of the right to receive it, said the Court, and realization is generally
not deemed to occur until the income is paid. However, where no pay-
ment is received, ". .. realization may occur when the last step is taken by
which [taxpayer] obtains the fruition of the economic gain which has al-
ready accrued to him." 29 Procuring the payment of income directly to
creditors30 or other third persons by anticipatory assignment will not
avail in escaping tax liability even though no money or property is re-
ceived by the taxpayer.
The decision in the Horst case does not immediately appear to be a
startling departure from the other cases in this line until one realizes that
the assignment did not in any manner depend upon the continued services
of the taxpayer in producing the income. Instead, the Lucas case doctrine
was broadened so that the crucial question became the exercise of the
power of assignment over the right to the income rather than the con-
tinued performance of services by the assignor as a condition precedent
to validating the assignment. The illogical inconsistency between this de-
cision and the traditional concept of cash basis accounting was ineptly
handled by allowing the assignor to return the income in the year in
which paid, even though the realization of income was accelerated by the
assignment to the date on which the assignment took place.
The decision in the Horst case resulted in an entirely new line of cases
involving the assignment of personal property or choses in action and
whether or not an anticipatory assignment of income resulted therefrom.
The Blair and Horst cases were arrayed one against the other, the former
being favorable to the taxpayer and the latter to the government. The
first issue, if present, was whether the taxpayer had sufficiently divested
himself of control over the income-producing property to treat the
assignee as the true owner, as under the Blair case. If the taxpayer sus-
tained his burden on this issue, he might still be forced to overcome the
ruling in the Horst case by showing that no "economic gain" or "realiza-
tion of income" inured to his benefit by reason of the assignment if
accrued but unrealized income was also assigned.3 1 Generally the applica-
28 311 U.S. 112 (1940). 29Ibid.
30 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
81 "The dominant purpose of the revenue laws is the taxation of income to those
who earn or otherwise create the right to receive it and enjoy the benefit of it when
paid." Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 119 (1940).
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tion of one case has resulted in distinguishing the other.82 One of the clear-
est applications of the Horst case in this area appeared in Austin v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue 3 where taxpayer, the holder of an interest-
bearing note, gave it to her sons together with the right to receive
the accrued interest. The interest, when paid, was taxed to the donor
under the Horst case, even though the donor had completely divested her-
self of control over the income-producing property.3 4 The Court refused
to apply the Blair case because the interest was earned, though unpaid, at
the time the gift was made.85 The question as to whether the decision in
the Horst case would have been different had the taxpayer made a gift of
the bonds at the same time he made a gift of the attached coupons was
disposed of under the ruling in the Austin case. However, the Court went
on to state that any interest accruing on the note after the date of
the gift was taxable to the donees, applying the Blair case in this instance.
In Galt v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 36 taxpayer irrevocably
assigned a portion of the proceeds of a twenty year lease to his four sons,
but retained the leasehold himself after the expiration of the twenty year
period. Once again it was held that the retention of the leasehold, the in-
come-producing property, by the assignor resulted in an anticipatory
assignment of income. The Blair case could not be applied since there was
no attempt to assign the leasehold.
Questions arising under the Blair case relating to the retention of con-
trol over trust property or trust income37 have now been settled by a
controlling provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and a correla-
tive Internal Revenue Bulletin issued shortly after the 1954 Code went
32 Huber v. Helvering, 117 F.2d 782 (App.D.C., 1941); United States v. Horschel,
205 F.2d 646 (C.A.9th, 1953); Fisher v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 209 F.2d
513 (CA.6th, 1954); Gait v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 216 F.2d 41 (C.A.7th,
1954).
33 161 F.2d 666 (C.A.6th, 1947).
34 But where the obligor was insolvent at the time of the assignment, there could
be no intent to shift the tax burden by anticipatory assignment. Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue v. Timken, 141 F.2d 625 (C.A.6th, 1944).
5 Cf., where taxpayer sold defaulted notes with interest in arrears at a price in
excess of the principal amount, the excess was taxed as ordinary income rather than
capital gain, it making no difference whether the obligor or a subsequent purchaser of
the note pays the interest. Fisher v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 209 F.2d 513
(C.A.6th, 1954). But where a corporation distributed notes with accrued interest
which it was holding to the shareholders in dissolution of the corporation, there was
no anticipatory assignment of income of the corporation. United States v. Horschel,
205 F.2d 646 (C.A.9th, 1953).
30 216 F. 2d 41 (C.A.7th, 1954).
87 Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); Farkas v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 170 F.2d 201 (C.A.Sth, 1948); Huber v. Helvering, 117 F.2d 782 (C.A.Sth,
1941).
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into effect. Sections 673 and 676 of the Internal Revenue Code of 195438
provide that if a reversionary interest or power of revocation retained by
the settlor of a trust is not to take effect for at least ten years from
the inception of the trust, the settlor will not be treated as the owner of
the trust corpus. The corresponding Revenue Ruling 39 provides that
where a life income beneficiary consents to the payment of trust income
to another, the beneficiary will be taxed, as he has parted with no sub-
stantial property, except that a valid and irrevocable assignment under
local law for a period of not less than ten years will make the income tax-
able to the assignee. This, of course, does not dispose of the more general
question of fact, which will continue to arise in non-trust cases as to
whether the taxpayer has parted with a substantial enough interest in the
propery so as not to be taxed as the owner thereof.
In conclusion, this writer believes it possible to formulate three criteria
for determining whether an assignment is to be treated as an anticipatory
assignment of income and taxable to the assignor or whether the tax bur-
den can successfully be shifted. Where the assignment is of income-pro-
ducing property, we will ignore the subtleties of legal title and tax the
person who retains effective ownership and control over the property,
subject to Sections 673 and 676 of the Internal Revenue Code of 195440
relating to trusts. Where the assignment is of unpaid income, choice of
the taxable person will depend upon whether any economic gain has
inured to the benefit of the assignor. Finally, in the instance of an assign-
ment of future income, the sole criterion should be whether the assignor
retains effective control over the income-producing entity, be it property
or the assignor's personal services. If the assignor must continue to per-
form some personal service subsequent to the assignment as a condition
to the production of income, then he is deemed not to have relinquished
control over the income-producing entity. Unfortunately, the entire area
of anticipatory assignmentof income has been defined by judicial con-
struction of the broadest possible statutory language. This leaves the tax-
payer with no assurance that judicial fiat will not once again alter the
effect of a decision on which the taxpayer has relied in selecting the
proper taxable person to return the income. The best we can hope for is
that the few well-lighted guideposts will not be dimmed by retrospective
judicial decision, but rather replaced by the affirmative assurances of Con-
gressional enactment.
38 Int. Rev. Code §§ 673,676, 26 U.S.C.A. § 673,676 (1954).
89 Rev. Rul. 55-38, I.R.B. 1955-4, 24 (1955). This ruling is an acquiescence by the
Commissioner to the decision in Farkas v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 170
F.2d 201 (C.A.Sth, 1948).
4 0 Int. Rev. Code §§ 673, 676, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 673, 676 (1954).
